RevUE de la conférence de Frédéric Mérand proposée par Justine Carbonnaux

« Doing Politics in the EU: The View From Inside », le 29 janvier 2025 avec Frédéric Mérand (Université de Montréal).

McGill University’s “The European Union and Europe” course was pleased to welcome guest speaker Frédéric Mérand, author of The Political Commissioner: A European Ethnography, who offered a sharp look at political dynamics within the European Union (EU). From 2015 to 2019, Mérand slipped into the cabinet of Pierre Moscovici, then European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, and transcribed his observations in his book. During his lecture, he gave us a captivating account of how politics fits into the EU’s seemingly technocratic framework.

The lecture was based on the idea that the EU differs from other international organizations (IOs), which, in theory, are concerned only with the application of international treaties and laws. According to Mérand, EU politicians have the capacity to make their actions political, which he defines in his book as the search for “the extension of the collective capacity to make choices in a context structured by various legal, economic, diplomatic, and technocratic constraints.”

In his view, the EU stands out because it has conditions that facilitate the exercise of politics, the most important of which is the existence of a parliament directly elected by the citizens of the member states. The EU is marked by the presence of transnational political parties, which is unique among IOs.

To support his main argument, our exchange revolved around fiscal surveillance, and more specifically, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Adopted in 1997, it aims to guarantee financial stability in the eurozone by imposing an annual public deficit not exceeding 3% of GDP and a public debt not exceeding 60% of GDP. Although ostensibly technical standards, their implementation and control quickly took on a political dimension.

In the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, many states found themselves outside the rules imposed by the Pact, making it increasingly controversial. Moscovici, despite being a Socialist, was responsible for applying strict budgetary rules, though this ran counter to his Keynesian economic philosophy. This contradiction culminated in 2016, when Moscovici declared that Spain and Portugal had broken the rules while imposing symbolic sanctions of zero euros.

Meanwhile, Italy, too, was plunging into ferocious debt. But this time, the decision took on a different dimension. It became more than just implementing the law but also fighting fascism, which had just come to power. The budget was rejected in October 2018, and negotiations began to gradually find a compromise. Today, almost half of the countries affected by the Pact are above the deficit limit, with no real sanctions.

The SGP has exacerbated political tensions between member states, particularly between those in the North (often in favor of strict budgetary discipline) and those in the South (more often faced with high deficits). This episode illustrates how politics interferes with legal obligations, even within a system governed by international treaties.

These observations can be reinforced by recent examples. For instance, the debate on budgetary rules in the face of inflation, which resurfaced with the rise in energy prices linked to the war in Ukraine, once again reflects the persistent divisions between member states.

Finally, we discussed the debate between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism among European politicians (Hooghe, 2012). For Mérand, this dichotomy is somewhat outdated. For example, he argues that members of parliament vote more often according to their party affiliation.

In sum, Frédéric Mérand’s lecture successfully demonstrated that, through crises, compromises, and tensions, the EU remains a fascinating laboratory for observing politics in action, even within a constrained institutional framework.

Justine Carbonnaux.